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EMPLOYER HEALTH-CARE MANDATES:
THE WRONG ANSWER TO THE WRONG
QUESTION
David S. Caroline*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A great paradox lies beneath the health-care debate in this country,
one that reflects both the greatness and the shortcomings of our capitalist
democracy. The United States has long been a leader in developing everbetter surgical, medical, and diagnostic procedures. Yet critics are quick to
point out that, despite the seemingly wide range of available treatments,
millions of Americans remain uninsured. 1 In widely-quoted studies, the
United States falls far behind other developed countries in measures of the
overall quality of the health care system. 2 How can these seemingly
contradictory situations be reconciled?
As is often the case, the explanation for one paradox may lie buried
within another. For most U.S. citizens, health care is either an employment
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1. For an illustration, consider the platforms of the various 2008 presidential
candidates. See, e.g., Jane Gross, A Complicated Balance of Policy and Personal, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, at A19 (noting John Edwards’ focus on universal health care in his
primary run). The debate has penetrated popular culture as well. See, e.g., SICKO (Dog Eat
Dog Films 2007) (chronicling the deficiencies in the American health care system).
2. See, e.g., News Release, The Commonwealth Fund, New National Scorecard: U.S.
Health Care System Gets Poor Scores on Quality, Access, Efficiency, and Equity (Sept. 20,
2006),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Scorecard_Release_FINAL_9-1906.pdf?section=4059 (noting that the United States lags behind other nations on key
healthcare indicators).
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benefit that their employers provide in the form of a tax-free health plan, 3
or a subsidy in the form of Medicare or Medicaid. Many Americans take
for granted that they will never have to spend more than a fixed amount of
money for coverage, regardless of the amount of care they receive. 4 What
we refer to as “health insurance” is in many ways a pre-paid health plan, as
most beneficiaries are certain to use the services of the insurance at some
point. 5
Employers provide the majority of these plans. 6 Although the nation
has become comfortable with this arrangement, this setup significantly
contributes to the perceived problem of inadequate access to health care in
the United States. Still, while the problem is significant, it is not quite as
drastic as the quoted statistics indicate. Consequently, proposals for laws
that mandate employers to provide health insurance to their employees are
misguided and based on mistaken premises.
Part II of this Comment explores the origins of the system in which
employers pay for employees’ health care, and covers the more recent
phenomenon of state mandates. It concludes with an analysis of some of
the economics literature on employer-based health care. Part III discusses
in greater depth some of the problems with, and critiques of, the employerbased system’s ability to provide broad coverage. Part III also considers
the relatively recent efforts in Massachusetts to ensure that all of its citizens
have insurance, and specifically focuses on the provisions that function as
weak mandates on employers to provide insurance. Part IV presents an
alternative to employer-based health care and is followed by concluding
remarks in Part V.

3. See generally The Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research and Educational
Trust, Employer Health Benefits, 2006 Summary of Findings [hereinafter 2006 Kaiser
Findings] (summarizing findings on employer-sponsored health insurance based on a
national survey of private and public employers of three or more workers).
4. After paying yearly premiums, if the employer does not cover an employee’s
medical service or product, the employee must pay annual deductibles and per-visit co-pays.
5. This characteristic of health insurance does not extend to all forms of insurance.
With car insurance, for example, a careful and lucky driver who regularly pays insurance
premiums may never receive a dime back from the insurance company. The only benefit for
that driver was the assurance that insurance would cover the driver in an accident. In fact,
what we refer to as “health insurance” often is used interchangeably with the term “health
care.”
6. See 2006 Kaiser Findings, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that, in 2006, employers
provided coverage for over 155 million non-elderly in the United States).
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II.

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYER-BASED
HEALTH CARE AND STATE EMPLOYER MANDATES

A.

Employer-Based Health Care

Employers have not always been the nation’s primary providers of
health insurance. The current system traces its origins to the price controls
instituted during World War II. 7 Because contributions to health insurance
did not count as wages, employers had to compete for workers by offering
health benefits that were exempt from the wartime price controls. But,
what began as a short-term loophole to compete for quality labor during the
war era became an entrenched apparatus, due to an IRS ruling that
employees did not have to pay income tax on the health benefits that
employers provide. 8 Coupled with the fact that employers could deduct the
benefits they provided as a business expense, health insurance became a
tax-free gift from Uncle Sam to employers. 9 By amending the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC), Congress made permanent the IRS ruling to exempt
health benefits from income tax. 10 Large firms realized that it would be
cheaper to self-insure than to pay a third-party insurer to do anything more
than administer the program. Furthermore, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 11 made self-insurance even more
attractive to employers because the new law prohibited states from enacting
laws that would overburden these self-insured plans. As such, most large
firms now self-insure. 12 Health coverage by employers reached a peak in
the late 1980’s, 13 and employers now cover 63% of non-elderly individuals
in the country with health insurance. 14

7. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25.
8. Id.
9. Id. It could be argued that employers are the real beneficiaries of this system. With
wage controls now a long-forgotten relic, employers can offer this benefit to employees at
what is effectively a discount price. Because the value to employees is greater than an
equivalent in taxed cash compensation, employers can substitute a greater amount of wages
than they would if health insurance were taxed.
10. See I.R.C. § 106 (1986) (excluding health and accident plans from employee gross
income calculations); see also I.R.C. § 125(a) (1986) (“Except as provided in subsection (b),
no amount shall be included in the gross income of a participant in a cafeteria plan solely
because, under the plan, the participant may choose among the benefits of the plan.”).
11. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.).
12. Alain C. Enthoven & Victor R. Fuchs, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Past,
Present, And Future, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1538, 1540 (Nov./Dec. 2006).
13. Id. at 1539.
14. Brigitte C. Madrian, The U.S. Health Care System and Labor Markets 1-34, 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11,980, 2006).
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State Mandates

In recent years, in an effort to broaden the insured population, a
majority of states have considered legislation that creates either a mandate
or negative incentive (i.e., a penalty) to induce employers to provide health
insurance. 15 Proponents of these mandates 16 advance the theory that
employers are in the best position to reach the widest swath of people with
coverage. This type of plan is referred to as a “pay or play” law. 17 The
justification for a mandate or penalty is that uninsured employees
ultimately drain common resources when they either receive Medicaid or
utilize emergency care that other state taxpayers subsidize. Thus, the
argument goes, employers that do not provide insurance should pay back
the state and the taxpayers for the inevitable drain on public resources. 18
At last count, twenty-eight states have considered enacting mandates
in the last three years. 19 Of those states that considered “pay or play” laws,
twenty states were unable to pass bills through committee, 20 six states have
bills remaining before committees, 21 and two states passed the mandates.
With respect to the two states that passed the mandates, Maryland and
Massachusetts, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Maryland’s

15. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Health Insurance 2006 Pay or Play
Bills, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/payorplay2006.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2008)
[hereinafter NCSL] (listing bills in state congresses that propose various forms of employer
mandates).
16. Governor Ed Rendell of Pennsylvania advocated a statewide health insurance
reform law that included an employer mandate, suggesting a 3% payroll tax on businesses
with more than fifty employees that do not provide health insurance to workers. The
Governor later bowed to pressure from employer groups and dropped the payroll tax from
his plan. See Tom Barnes, Health Plan Progress Disappoints Rendell, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Dec. 16, 2007, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07350/841773-85.stm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2008).
17. NCSL, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. These states and their respective bills are: Alaska HB 449 (2006), Arizona SB 1232
(2006), Colorado HB 1316 (2006), Connecticut SB 462 (2006), Florida HB 813 (2006),
Georgia SB 579 (2006), Iowa SB 2246 (2006) and HF 2430 (2006), Kansas HB 2579 (2006)
and SB 557 (2006), Kentucky HB 98 (2006) and HB 493 (2006), Louisiana SB 69 (2006),
Mississippi SB 2684 (2006), Missouri HB 1463 (2006) and related bill SB 944 (2006), New
Hampshire HB 1703 (2006), HB 1704 (2006), and HB 633 (2006), Oklahoma HB 2678
(2006), Rhode Island HB 6917 (2006) and HB 6984 (2006), Tennessee SB 3392 and related
bill HB 3962 (2006), HB 3354 and related bill SB 3729 (2006), Virginia HB 258 (2006),
Washington HB 2517 (2006) and SB 6356 (2006), West Virginia HB 4024 and identical bill
SB 147, and Wisconsin AB 860 (2006). Id.
21. These states and their respective bills are: Michigan SB 87 (2007), Minnesota HB
39 (2007), California SB 1414 (2006) and SB 593 (2006), New Jersey AB 2513 (2006) and
SB 47 (2006), New York SB 7090 (2006), AB 9534 (2006), AB 4129 (2006), SB 6989
(2006), AB 9776 (2006), and SB 6644 (2006), and Ohio HB 471 (2006). Id.
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mandate after the state legislature overturned a veto from the governor 22
and Massachusetts toned down its proposal significantly. As of this
Comment’s printing, Massachusetts remains the only state other than
Hawaii 23 with a pay or play mandate officially on the books and
unchallenged by a court decision. 24 Nevertheless, Massachusett’s mandate
may also be invalidated if the Second Circuit Court of Appeals follows the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision and holds that ERISA preempts
pay or play mandates. 25
C.

The Massachusetts Plan—An Experiment in Progress

The Massachusetts plan offers insight into the workings of a
successfully implemented health care mandate. On April 12, 2006, the
Massachusetts state legislature passed Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006,
which provided a comprehensive plan to push the state towards the elusive
goal of universal health coverage. 26 When signing the bill into law, thenGovernor Mitt Romney vetoed the mandate provisions that imposed fines
and other negative incentives on employers that did not provide their
workers with health insurance. In his veto signing statement, Governor
Romney stated simply that the mandates were “not necessary to implement
or finance health care reform.” 27 The legislature, however, overrode the
Governor’s veto and enacted the original bill into law in its entirety. 28
The Massachusetts plan attacks the problem of an uninsured

22. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding
that ERISA preempted Maryland’s law that required super-large employers to either provide
health benefits to their workers or face stiff penalties).
23. Hawaii passed its Prepaid Health Care Act in 1974, shortly before Congress passed
ERISA in that same year. Though initially challenged, Congress granted the Hawaii act an
exemption from ERISA. See Fernando R. Laguarda, Note, Federalism Myth: States as
Laboratories of Health Care Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 181 (1993) (discussing the Hawaii
Prepaid Health Care Act); National Conference of State Legislatures, Hawaii–Prepaid
Health Care Act, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/dhmaine.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2008) (noting Hawaii’s exemption from Congress). Hawaii remains the only state with such
an exemption, but there is a low compliance rate in the state and the Prepaid Health Care
Act lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms. Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun, Let
1000 Flowers Wilt: The Futility of State-Level Health Care Reform, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
1173, 1175-77 (2007).
24. See NCSL, supra note 15 (listing pay or play mandate proposals by various states).
25. See Part III(D) (discussing potential preemption challenges that ERISA may pose to
pay or play mandates).
26. The
Massachusetts
Plan,
2006
Mass.
Acts
58,
available
at
http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060058.htm.
27. Signing Statement of Governor Mitt Romney, Attachment A (Apr. 12, 2006) (on
file with author), http://www.ncsl.org/print/health/vetoletter.pdf.
28. H.R. 4850, 2006 Leg., 184th Sess. (Mass. 2006) was enacted into law as 2006
Mass. Acts 58.
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population from several angles. First, on the individual front, it creates an
“insurance connector” that gives individuals and small businesses access to
group insurance products that are portable from one employer to another,
which individuals can maintain outside of a formal job. 29 Second, the plan
creates an individual mandate that requires all non-exempt individuals 30 to
obtain and maintain health insurance by July 2007. 31 Third, the plan
subsidizes insurance for individuals who earn less than 300% 32 of the
federal poverty line (currently $10,400 for an individual with no other
household members). 33
The plan also has three provisions that create obligations for
employers. 34 First, it requires each employer to offer a “cafeteria style
plan” to employees, 35 also known as a “Section 125” plan. 36 Second, it
forces companies with more than eleven full-time equivalent workers to
make a “fair and reasonable premium contribution” 37 to a group health
plan. The plan leaves the meaning of a “fair and reasonable” contribution
open to further regulatory interpretation. Currently, state regulation defines
the phrase as either (1) an enrollment of 25% of full-time employees in the
employer’s plan, 38 or (2) an employer’s payment of 33% of the premium
costs for all of its fulltime employees. 39 Finally, the plan provides for a
“fair share contribution” in the form of payment from employers that do

29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q (2007).
30. The state board of Massachusetts enacted an exemption for individuals who can
demonstrate that they are unable to afford even the lowest-cost insurance, based on a sliding
scale calculation. See 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 111M.00(3)(c)(2007) (making the
Massachusetts Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector responsible for setting annual
affordability schedules for the individual mandate).
31. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2 (2007).
32. Id.
33. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. 3971-72 (Jan. 23,
2008).
34. Known collectively as “employer mandates” or the “pay or play” provisions.
35. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2 (2007) (“Each employer with more than 10
employees in the commonwealth shall adopt and maintain a cafeteria plan that satisfies 26
U.S.C. 125 and the rules and regulations promulgated by the connector . . . .”).
36. Referring to 26 U.S.C. § 125 (2006) (defining cafeteria-style plans as those that
allow employees to choose among different plans).
37. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b) (2007) (“[E]ach employer that (i) employs 11
or more full-time equivalent employees in the commonwealth and (ii) is not a contributing
employer shall pay a per-employee contribution at a time and in a manner prescribed by the
director of workforce development, in consultation with the director of unemployment
assistance, in this section called the fair share employer contribution.”).
38. Some state legislators suggest that this percentage should be increased to as high as
50%. See Jeffrey Krasner, Business Leader Suggests Health Law Too Easy on Firms,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2007, at C1 (stating that 50% should be the standard to keep “good
people working for [the company]”).
39. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.03(3)(c)-(d) (2007).
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not pay a “fair and reasonable premium contribution.” 40 This provision is
known as “pay or play.” 41 Due to a series of compromises, however, the
“pay” factor “shall not exceed $295 per employee which may be made in a
single payment, or in equal amounts semi-annually or quarterly, at the
employer’s discretion.” 42 As a testament to the motivation behind this
provision, the contribution is “calculated to reflect a portion of the cost paid
by the state for free care used by workers whose employers do not provide
insurance.” 43
D.

Health Insurance and Incentives

A review of scholarly literature on the economics of health insurance,
particularly employer-based health insurance, may inform the discussion
about how people tend to respond to incentives. Specifically, how do
individual incentives relate to the current system of employer-based health
insurance? Several studies 44 illuminate the trend that people’s behavior,
whether consciously or not, is shaped by their incentives to work or retire,
to stay in a job or to move, and to insure or not to insure.
The first question relevant to a discussion about providing broader
health coverage should ask why people lack coverage in the first place. An
easy answer is that people cannot afford such coverage. Although
sometimes true, this is not necessarily the correct answer in all cases.
Affordability is a relative concept; unless an individual literally is destitute,
his or her decision not to buy health insurance is exactly that—a decision.
As things stand, a truly destitute individual would likely qualify for
Medicaid. 45 Depending on the importance of having at least some degree
of health coverage, a person could spend all of his or her money on health
care, and subsequently qualify for Medicaid. Judge Richard Posner, of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, posited as much when he
stated:
[It is not] a scandal, or even a serious inefficiency, that many
millions of workers do not have health insurance. Their health
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Wash. D.C.), June 28, 2007, at 4 (discussing
potential preemption of pay or play provisions).
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(c)(10) (2007).
43. Massachusetts Health Care Access and Affordability Conference Committee Report
(Apr. 3, 2006), at 4, http://www.mass.gov/legis/summary.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Brigitte C. Madrian, Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job
Mobility: Is There Evidence of Job Lock?, 109 Q. J. OF ECON. 27, 52 (1994).
45. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid—Kaiser State Health Facts,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/medicaid.jsp (last visited Oct. 23, 2008) (describing stateby-state eligibility for Medicaid).

434

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:2

care is paid for my [sic] Medicaid if they cannot afford to buy
health insurance whether directly or as part of an employee group
health insurance plan. Those that can afford health insurance but
forgo it either are young and healthy or are risk preferrers,
gambling that they will avoid illnesses requiring expensive
treatment. If their gamble fails, they will have to pay out of their
pockets, and when their pockets are empty (their assets depleted)
go onto Medicaid, where their care will be subsidized. 46
While this account may sound somewhat cold, it reflects the reality
that, excluding some very serious exceptions, many of the uninsured
choose to remain uninsured, even if it is a bad choice. Even the
characterization of a “bad choice” reflects a moral judgment that health, or
more accurately, insurance against the possibility of future bad health, is
more valuable than whatever else a person trades for health. This argument
would seem less drastic if health insurance functioned as true protection
against future disaster, rather than as essentially a pre-paid health care plan.
The category of catastrophic health insurance, which insures against less
likely, but potentially expensive medical events and conditions, is more
affordable than the comprehensive coverage that many insurers offer.
One study about health care affordability found results that challenge
some basic assumptions in the health care debate. M. Kate Bundorf and
Mark V. Pauly analyzed the definition of “affordability” as it relates to
health care. 47 Somewhat surprisingly, they found that many who can
“afford” health insurance do not have coverage, while many who cannot
“afford” health insurance do have coverage. 48 This study illustrates that,
notwithstanding the many individuals who gravely need assistance, 49
commentators must not take even basic definitions for granted in this
sometimes emotionally charged debate.
One criticism of the employer-based system is that it makes health
insurance less portable. The theory behind this criticism is that, because
work plans make most insurance available at cheaper costs, an employee
with an uninsurable ailment will be strongly disinclined to leave his or her
job, as it likely will be difficult or impossible to acquire insurance from a
different source. This phenomenon is known as “job-lock.” 50 Based on
job-lock theory, one economist posits the following:
46. Posting
of
Richard
Posner,
http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/archives/2007/04/the_reform_of_h.html (Apr. 15, 2007, 19:29 EST).
47. M. Kate Bundorf & Mark V. Pauly, Is Health Insurance Affordable for the
Uninsured?, 25 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 650, 650 (2006).
48. Id. at 667.
49. This Comment stresses this point to make clear that for many people, health care is
truly unaffordable, such that they must take drastic and tragic measures to secure some form
of coverage.
50. Madrian, supra note 44, at 27.
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[W]e would expect retirement rates to be higher among those
with portable health insurance. Once individuals reach age 65
and are eligible for Medicare, losing health insurance coverage
completely is no longer a concern for those workers previously
covered by employer-provided health insurance. Thus, after age
65, retirement rates among those with non-portable insurance will
no longer be lower, and indeed, may increase if individuals have
postponed retirement until becoming eligible for Medicare. 51
Indeed, “[s]everal studies have found evidence that individuals whose
employers provide retiree health insurance leave the labor force earlier than
individuals whose employers do not.” 52
In two particular findings, Professor Bridgette Madrian found strong
evidence of job-lock. 53 First, married men without health insurance who
have pregnant wives are twice as likely to change jobs as married men
without health insurance whose wives are not pregnant. 54 This suggests
that the search for adequate health insurance is bound tightly to the search
for employment. 55 Second, Madrian found that individuals covered
through their spouse’s insurance are more likely to change jobs. 56 While
this conclusion may reflect mixed survey results, it could also reflect two
different types of job mobility: intended and forced. An individual who
needs better insurance might change jobs, even if he or she otherwise is
quite content and productive, which in turn causes an unnecessary loss in
efficiency. Likewise, if a person is not bound to an employer for health
insurance, he or she probably would move to a better job in line with
market forces. 57
Yet another study found that firms in Hawaii would rather require
their existing employees to work longer hours than hire new employees, to
avoid health care costs that rise with each additional worker but not with
increased hours. 58 This effect has been observed across states. 59
Although not studied widely, another interesting side-effect of
51. Madrian, supra note 14, at 8.
52. Id.
53. Madrian, supra note 44, at 52.
54. Id. at 49.
55. Id. at 47-50.
56. Madrian, supra note 14, at 18.
57. Id. at 17.
58. See Norman K. Thurston, Labor Market Effects of Hawaii’s Mandatory EmployerProvided Health Insurance, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 117 (1997) (finding that, after
Hawaii mandated employers to provide health insurance in 1974, companies with few
covered full-time workers saw dramatic rises in the number of part-time workers).
59. David M. Cutler & Brigitte C. Madrian, Labor Market Responses to Rising Health
Insurance Costs: Evidence on Hours Worked, 29(3) RAND J. ECON. 509, 530 (1998); see
Madrian, supra note 14, at 20-21 (finding that firms have increased significantly the weekly
hours worked by fewer workers in response to rising health care costs).
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increasing access to health insurance is that the new demand for health care
may not match the supply of available treating physicians. A recent article
in the New York Times highlighted the long waits for primary care visits
that have emerged in the wake of Massachusetts’ comprehensive scheme to
universalize health insurance. 60
In sum, regulated health insurance markets create a host of
complicated incentives that affect individuals’ decisions about whether to
purchase health coverage. Relevant studies, however, have not been able
to define a clear link between these incentives and individuals’ coverage
decisions.
III. THE PROS AND CONS OF AN EMPLOYER-BASED SYSTEM
A.

Strategic Advantages of the Employer-Based System

Despite its flaws, the employer-based health care system has some
apparent advantages that have kept it around for over sixty years. Perhaps
the strongest argument in favor of the employer-based system is that it
avoids adverse-selection problems. 61 Some even argue that employerbased coverage is “a key factor in the survival of the private insurance
market,” 62 explaining:
Insurance markets of all types can become unstable because
people choose to purchase coverage (or choose which type of
coverage to purchase) based on their own information about their
likely need for services, a process called adverse selection. This
selective purchasing behavior can make it difficult for insurers to
accurately price their policies and may ultimately drive them out
of business. Because employment groups are generally formed
for reasons other than health insurance purchasing, insurers can
avoid this selection problem by covering groups. 63
One somewhat banal, though not insignificant justification is simply
that the system has worked thus far. Employers have been the bedrock of
our private health care system for the majority of the twentieth century 64
and the country has produced many of the greatest innovations in health
60. Kevin Sack, Universal Coverage Strains Massachusetts Care, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2008, at A1.
61. In this context, adverse selection is the process whereby the persons who pose the
least risk to insurers will self-select cheaper coverage, and leave the most risky persons to
pool together. This process essentially would repeat until the least insurable are effectively
uninsurable.
62. Sherry A. Glied & Phyllis C. Borzi, The Current State of Employment-Based Health
Coverage, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 404, 407 (2004).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 404.
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care. In reality, however, “[v]irtually no one defends the health care status
quo in the United States . . . .” 65 Though the quality of care available to
many in the United States is virtually unmatched, access is not as widely
available or affordable as one would expect in a competitive market
environment.
Some other oft-cited justifications for the employer-based system are
that it improves worker loyalty, decreases turnover, and reduces truancy
due to illness. 66 Nevertheless, a decrease in turnover is not necessarily a
desirable economic outcome. In fact, some cite decreased turnover due to
job-lock for fear of losing valuable health insurance as a downside of the
employer-based system. 67 Although the other two arguments of reducing
absenteeism and improving loyalty both are positive outcomes, the
employer does not necessarily have to provide health care to achieve these
ends. Employers could create the same, if not better, outcomes if they give
workers the cash equivalent of health care, and allow them to buy their own
coverage or use the money as they see best.
A final argument in favor of the current system is that it protects
against risk over time. In the risk-over-time hypothesis, individuals who
are not in a group plan are subject to termination from their individual
plans as soon as a chronic and expensive condition materializes. 68 While
some regulations, including amendments to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA) to extend applicability
to individual insurance policies, 69 can prevent this type of problem, some
argue that regulations to prevent insurers from dropping clients outright
remain insufficient; “selection often drives up prices for those who choose
to remain in the market.” 70 One response to these arguments is that
individuals, even outside the workplace, would be able to pool together in
affinity groups to purchase health insurance in group plans and spread the
cost of risk amongst themselves. Such groups might include unions,
religious organizations, and industry associations, which government
initiatives could support. An example familiar to New Yorkers in
particular is the Freelancers Union, with its well-known marketing
campaign to attract new members in part through the union’s health
65. Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and
Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 276 (2007).
66. Glied & Borzi, supra note 62, at 405.
67. See Madrian, supra note 44, at 47 (noting that health insurance may distort job
mobility); Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market 1-86, at 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6762, 1998) (noting that workers may be
“locked” into their jobs for fear of losing health insurance).
68. Id.
69. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191 (1996).
70. Glied & Borzi, supra note 62, at 407.
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insurance offerings. 71
B.

Problems Associated with Employer-Provided Healthcare

Despite the arguments to maintain a system in which employers
primarily carry the burden to provide health care for the nation’s
workforce, more convincing claims militate against the status quo.
Employer-based health care creates unfair tax advantages, misaligns
incentives and preferences, results in excessive reliance on federal support,
and generates numerous market inefficiencies.
1.

Unfair Tax Advantage

The tax advantage discussed in Part II, supra, is the engine that drives
the employer-based system. Any tax incentive, however, is really just a
redistribution of sorts. 72 As it stands, the employed get a tax break to
procure health insurance, whereas the unemployed do not get the same
advantage. 73 This simply adds to an uneven playing field, as individuals
outside of group plans face adverse selection problems that result in
already-higher costs. 74
2.

Misaligned Incentives

Employers act as third-party intermediaries between the insured and
the product. Because employers by definition must provide insurance to
groups of people, they must choose to offer insurance products that meet
the basic needs of all their employees, such that employers are not able to
customize their choice of insurance products the same way an individual
who purchases his or her own insurance might. 75 The most striking
example of this is that employers generally favor managed care, whereas
employees prefer the greater flexibility of plans that allow choices of
providers. 76 If the system aligned incentives completely, employers and

71. See Judith Messina, Independent Workers Come of Age, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 1,
2007, at 13 (discussing the Freelancers Union’s efforts at providing services and advocacy
for independent contractors).
72. See Posting of Richard Posner, supra note 46 (noting that taxpayers and employees
really pay for employer-based health care through tax subsidies and lower wages brought on
by the higher labor costs of job-based health insurance).
73. For an illustration of this phenomenon, see Messina, supra note 71 (explaining that
independent contractors trade certain benefits for their employment autonomy).
74. Id.; Posting of Gary Becker, supra note 80.
75. David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 233-34 (2000).
76. Id. at 227.
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employees would prefer the same insurance products. Some even argue
that “[m]ost of the difficulties with employment-based insurance stem from
the fact that someone other than the ultimate consumer of health care is
making most of the decisions about what coverage to purchase and how
much to pay.” 77
3.

Inefficiencies and Over-Spending on Health Care

In the health insurance context, several studies indicate that more
coverage does not necessarily mean better coverage. In the famous fifteenyear RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RHIE) that began in 1971, 78
investigators determined that, among test groups who had access to
different levels of insurance coverage, higher co-insurance rates had no
adverse consequences on the average person. 79 Because health care
benefits are not part of taxable income and there are no limits on the
deductible amount, employers have incentive to load up on health benefits
and offer the “best” possible plan to woo the best job seekers. 80 However,
as the RHIE makes clear, 81 providing more coverage will not necessarily
ensure healthier workers. 82 Even absenteeism may increase with better
insurance, perhaps because doctor visits become more affordable. 83 In fact,
the RHIE suggests that employees are often over-insured and consume
more health products without realizing a gain that would be expected in
normal consumption behavior. 84
Furthermore, some maintain that better access to health care through
more comprehensive insurance can lead to riskier behavior and worse
health. In one study, Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann found that
alcohol use increased at a statistically significant rate after the government

77. Hyman & Hall, supra note 7, at 26-27.
78. Robert H. Brook et al., The Health Insurance Experiment: A Classic RAND Study
Speaks to the Current Health Care Reform Debate (RAND Health, Santa Monica, Cal.),
2006, http://rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB9174.pdf.
79. See Jonathan Gruber, The Role of Consumer Copayments for Health Care: Lessons
from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment and Beyond (The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, Menlo Park, Cal.), Oct. 2006 (highlighting lessons from the Rand Health
Insurance Experiment).
80. Posting
of
Gary
Becker,
http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/archives/2007/01/reforming_the_a.html (Jan. 29, 2007, 20:54 EST).
81. Brook et al., supra note 78, at 3.
82. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do State
Health Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption?, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 175 (2006)
(finding increased availability of addiction treatment led to higher alcohol consumption
rates).
83. JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
84. Brook et al., supra note 78, at 3.
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introduced laws that required insurers to provide drug treatment coverage. 85
Likewise, it has been suggested, if not proven, that wide access to health
care of an unprecedented quality has caused the obesity epidemic in the
United States, as consumers feel freer to engage in risky eating behavior
when sated with the knowledge that science will cure all ills. 86 Once
recognized, this inefficiency became a main impetus for President George
W. Bush’s push 87 for Health Savings Accounts (HSA). 88 The theory
behind HSAs is that, if consumers are given money in the form of tax free
contributions instead of directly-subsidized health services, they will be
more cost-conscious and will consume insurance products more
efficiently. 89
4.

Reliance on Federal Programs

Employer-based health care is not a panacea—it does not cover
everyone. In 2000, the percentage of firms that offered health benefits was
69%, 90 while in 2006, only 61% of firms offered health benefits to at least
some of their employees (a similar percentage to the previous year). 91
Inevitably, a system that relies so heavily on employers to provide
insurance creates massive gaps of coverage with, namely, the unemployed,
underemployed, self-employed, and the retired. To fill those gaps, the
government had no better option than to bolster the bloated spending
programs of Medicaid and Medicare. 92

5.

Overall Market Inefficiencies

A tangible result can be observed in the automobile industry, 93 where
the burden of lifetime health care costs and pension obligations to workers

85. Klick & Stratmann, supra note 82, at 7.
86. MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER’S MANIFESTO 9 (Penguin Press,
N.Y. 2008).
87. See, e.g., Tami Luhby, Bush Proposal to Push Health Savings Accounts, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 24, 2007 (discussing President George W. Bush’s plans in previous years to promote
HSA’s).
88. Cf. Jennifer Spiegel, Comment, Employee Driven Health Care: Health Savings
Accounts, More Harm Than Good, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 219 (arguing that HSA’s are
not a good vehicle for making health care spending more efficient).
89. Id. at 223-24.
90. 2006 Kaiser Findings, supra note 3, at 4.
91. Id.
92. See Madrian, supra note 14, at 4-5 (providing an overview of the U.S. health care
system and discussing the impact of a fragmented system of health insurance delivery).
93. See Joseph B. White et al., GM Labor Deal Ushers In New Era for Auto Industry,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2007, at A1 (documenting GM’s contractual restructuring of health
care benefits to its employees).
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who sometimes live over 40 years after retirement has crippled domestic
manufacturers. 94 Japanese car makers have capitalized on this situation
and advanced to lead the race by becoming the largest car-makers in the
world. 95

C. Why Mandates are Particularly Problematic
As with the tax incentives in the classic system of employer-based
health care, mandates encourage employers to assume the burden of
covering their workers. Nevertheless, mandates use sticks instead of (or in
addition to) carrots. 96 The only deficiency that a mandate aims to cure is
when employer health care does not reach a wide enough swath of the
population. Even if the problems enumerated in Part II (B) did not exist,
mandates would fail to accomplish their goal, and in fact can make the
situation worse.
According to one study, about 60% of uninsured workers will remain
uninsured if New York enacts its pay or play plan. 97 The study used the
New York plan to estimate what effect similar plans would have in other
states if enacted. One of the major reasons the large number of uninsured
would remain untouched is that small companies, which the plan exempts
out of economic and political necessity, employ over 40% of uninsured
workers. 98 Another complicating factor is that the plans would not benefit
the majority of workers who earn less than twice the poverty line. 99 Most
troubling, the report finds that, as with a minimum wage law, a pay or play
mandate would drive up the effective cost of hiring low skilled workers in a
region by adding an additional layer of cost, which consequently takes
away jobs from the very population that the solution intends to help. 100
On the other hand, mandates also do what they are meant to do, i.e., to
ensure that more employers provide health insurance to their employees.
By creating such an incentive, however, the problems with employer-based
health care become more widespread. An example of the ensuing irony
comes from then-presidential candidate Barack Obama’s platform on

94. See Chad Terhune & Laura Meckler, A Turning Point for Health Care, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 27, 2007, at F1 (discussing economic problems of employer-based health care).
95. Amy Chozick & Norihiko Shirouzu, GM Slips Into Toyota’s Rearview Mirror—
Japanese Firm Passes U.S. Rival for First Time in Quarterly Global Sales, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 25, 2007, at A7.
96. See generally Hyman, supra note 41 (reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the
Massachusetts plan).
97. Richard V. Burkhauser & Kosali I. Simon, Who Gets What From Employer Pay or
Play Mandates? 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,578, 2007).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 24.
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health care reform. 101 While the campaign promised portability and choice
through a National Health Insurance Exchange to make health coverage
affordable for individuals and small businesses, it simultaneously proposed
that “[e]mployers that do not offer coverage or make a meaningful
contribution to the cost of quality health coverage for their employees
[must] contribute a percentage of payroll toward the costs of their
employees[’] health care.” 102 Such a negative incentive will encourage
more employers to offer insurance, which, in turn, limits portability and
choice.

D. ERISA Preemption
Whether or not mandates are beneficial, their successful enacting
faces an uphill legal battle. In Retail Industry Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 103
the Fourth Circuit upheld a lower court’s ruling that ERISA preempted
Maryland’s pay or play plan and therefore nullified the state’s plan. 104 The
court found that, “[b]ecause the Act directly regulates employers’ provision
of healthcare benefits, it has a ‘connection with’ covered employers’
ERISA plans and accordingly is preempted by ERISA.” 105 The Maryland
mandate effectively targeted one company, Wal-Mart, 106 through various
provisions that restricted the mandate to super-large employers, and thus
singled out the Arkansas-based company. 107 But, the decision did not rest
on equal protection 108 grounds—it was based entirely on the laws of federal
preemption. 109 Similarly, in a suit against a New York county that passed a
comparable provision, the same plaintiff-organization successfully
challenged the county’s law in the Eastern District of New York. 110
101. Barack Obama & Joe Biden:
Plan for a Healthy America,
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/healthcare/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2008); see Shan
TIMES,
Carter
et
al.,
On
the
Issues:
Health
Care,
N.Y.
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/health.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2008)
(comparing the positions of presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain on
health care issues).
102. Id.
103. 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
104. Id. at 198.
105. Id. at 197.
106. Id. at 183.
107. Id. at 184-85.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating the Equal Protection Clause’s mandate
that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws”).
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI (declaring federal law as the “supreme Law of the Land” that
may preempt states in certain subject areas).
110. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 418 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
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These two cases demonstrate a probable basis upon which courts may
invalidate the law in Massachusetts or in any other state that passes a pay
or play mandate; ERISA likely will preempt a state law if the law
unconstitutionally infringes upon the congressional mandate for ERISA to
regulate certain employers’ benefits programs. 111 Nevertheless, this issue
is unlikely to fade away soon, as significant pressure mounts on both sides
of the issue, and some argue that ERISA should not preempt plans that
offer employers a choice to either pay or play. 112 In either case, advocates
of pay or play mandates seek to amend ERISA to allow state
experimentation with employer mandates and other health care provisions
that ERISA possibly may preempt. 113
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EMPLOYER-BASED SYSTEM
This Comment has identified several aspects of the employer-based
health care system that foster misaligned incentives, inefficient distribution
of health services, and inefficiencies in overall health care markets. This
section proposes that alternative market-based systems may avoid some of
these problems.
Health Savings Accounts 114 encourage individuals to pay for medical
expenses out-of-pocket by allowing individuals to apply pre-tax dollars
toward eligible medical costs. 115 For an HSA to qualify, it must be
accompanied by a high deductible health plan 116 (otherwise known as
catastrophic health insurance).
Individuals must pay for routine
expenditures out of the tax-deductible HSA, but the insurance plans kicks
in if an individual needs a major service that exceeds his or her
deductible. 117 Requiring individuals to pay for the most routine medical

111. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 65 (finding that the Massachusetts fair share
contribution provision is likely to be overturned under the same analysis as the Fourth
Circuit used in Retail Industry).
112. See, e.g., Rebecca A.D. O'Reilly, Is ERISA Ready for a New Generation of State
Health Care Reform? Preemption, Innovation, and Expanding Access to Health Care
Coverage, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 387, 407 (arguing, before the Fourth Circuit’s decision
in Retail Industry, that the Maryland plan is distinguishable from the previous health plans
that ERISA preempted, because the Maryland plan provided a choice to employers to either
dedicate 8% to health care costs or pay the difference to the state).
113. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 65 (arguing that Congress should amend ERISA to
allow states greater freedom to regulate healthcare).
114. See 26 U.S.C. § 223(e) (2006) (codifying the tax rules that govern Health Savings
Accounts).
115. See Spiegel, supra note 88, at 224-29 (summarizing the requirements and guidelines
of HSA’s).
116. See 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1)(A)(i)(2006) (defining an eligible individual as one
covered under a high deductible healthcare plan).
117. 26 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(2004) (defining allowable HAS contributions and spending).
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procedures, albeit with pre-tax dollars, creates a disincentive for excess
treatment.
By shifting the purchasing decisions from third parties back to the
individual, HSAs address the problem that employer-sponsored plans
cause, i.e., that pre-paid insurance plans effectively encourage an “all-youcan-treat” mentality among the insured. 118 In a normal consumption
environment, a consumer would evaluate the cost against the benefit. In
the current health care environment, because costs are generally fixed and
the large premiums that employers pay are tax-free, health consumers are
encouraged to use more services without due regard for the true costs.
When the cost of each incremental procedure approaches zero, the benefit
of conducting one more test or undergoing one more procedure may seem
to outweigh the risk of not doing so, even as the potential reward of that
test or procedure itself approaches zero. As such, the consumer does not
recognize true costs and uses services in a way that creates inefficiency. In
turn, market inefficiencies drive up the costs of premiums and overall
medical care, which further bars entry to low-income individuals.
One common criticism of HSAs is that they disproportionately benefit
the affluent because they are structured as a tax benefit. 119 But, that
concern ignores the broader impact that the efficient use of medical
resources can have on decreasing costs of medical care, which frees health
care providers from bloated cost structures associated with the “all-youcan-treat” health plans. Additionally, HSAs and catastrophic insurance can
be coupled with directly refundable tax credits rather than simple refunds,
which would provide cash for health coverage to anyone who files a tax
return. 120
Of course, a person might forego critical treatment to save his or her
own money, as opposed to that of the insurance program or employer.
Several factors, however, allay that concern. First, some measure of
control before spending on health services is efficient 121 and may even have
beneficial effects, such as limiting the moral hazard problems associated
with insurance. 122 Second, there is no indication that, when faced with the

118. See Brook et al., supra note 78 (documenting the impact of cost-sharing in
healthcare programs).
119. Spiegel, supra note 88, at 228.
120. The McCain presidential campaign had proposed such a rebate. See McCain-Palin
2008, http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/ (follow “Health Care” hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 23, 2008) (containing the McCain campaign’s proposal to offer such rebates);
see also Carter et al., supra note 101 (comparing the presidential candidates’ proposals on
healthcare).
121. See, e.g., Brook et al., supra note 78 (documenting the positive impact of cost
sharing in health care); Gruber, supra note 79 (evaluating the tradeoffs of patient coinsurance charges).
122. See Klick & Stratmann, supra note 82, at 181-82 (discussing how limiting the costs

2009]

EMPLOYER HEALTH-CARE MANDATES

445

option, people will choose to spend funds from an HSA to achieve better
health now at the cost of having less money available in the account for
future potential needs. Even if people do make this choice, there is no
reason to suspect that it is a bad choice, or that individual consumers of
health care are any less capable to make these risk/benefit decisions than an
outside organization. 123 In the true meaning of the word “insurance,”
health insurance would resemble closely an HSA plan. Insurance would
provide coverage (at a much lower cost) for rare, potentially bank-breaking
occurrences, but not for routine expenditures.
By analogy, HSAs more closely resemble the auto-insurance market,
where regular coverage typically applies only in the event of major
accidents. For example, if auto insurance covered routine maintenances
such as oil changes, tune-ups, new tires, etc., the cost for the insurance
would rise dramatically even if typical expenditures did not go up. If the
RAND study 124 is any indication of the behavior of insurance utilization as
a consequence of availability, it is easy to imagine that drivers would
change their oil far more frequently when they do not have to pay out of
pocket, even to a point beyond what is necessary.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the American public’s familiarity, and perhaps comfort, with
the notion that employers provide health insurance, the employer-based
health care system is the wrong answer. In fact, the very question of how
best to provide health insurance to every American should be rephrased as
how best to ensure that every American has access to affordable, quality
health care. Health care costs are soaring, physicians are leaving primary
care for specialties with higher reimbursements, and significant portions of
the population remain not only uninsured, but also without access to quality
care. The solution is to explore other market-based mechanisms for
providing health care, rather than requiring that more employers provide
more insurance. More efficient alternatives, such as Health Savings
Accounts, can make access to health care more widely available. This
option avoids some of the pitfalls of typical employment-provided health
care, and has some unique benefits that promote individual responsibility
for planning for health coverage in advance. Although this Comment does
not discuss them, other suggestions exist as well, including a proposal for

of addictive behavior can result in an increase in that type of behavior, or “rational
addiction”).
123. See, e.g., Posting of Richard Posner, supra note 46 (discussing regulatory and
market-based approaches to reducing the cost of healthcare).
124. Brook et al., supra note 78.
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individual rather than employer mandates. 125
The employer-based health care system maintains the broken status
quo because it creates misaligned incentives, eliminates otherwise viable
market forces, and to an extent, removes the individual from the decisionmaking process in his or her own health and well-being. Politicians and
lawmakers who look to fix the system often turn to employers and ask how
best to ensure that they provide more health insurance. But they are asking
the wrong question; the challenge of increasing efficient access to health
care requires shifting employers out of the business of providing health
care, and instead finding creative ways to enable individuals to purchase
the care they want and need in a market-based system.

125. See, e.g., The Massachusetts Plan, supra note 26 (legislating individual mandates as
part of a comprehensive plan to achieve universal health coverage); see also Obama &
Biden, supra note 101 (suggesting a plan that does not institute individual mandates across
the board, but calls for mandatory coverage of children). But see, Sack, supra note 60
(reporting that the Massachusetts individual mandate may be one factor causing a shortage
of primary care physicians in the state).

